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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have seen the introduction of markets and a system of private property 
rights in China with a view to changing the composition of production and demand 
and enhancing welfare. Central to the success of these reforms is the rise of 
entrepreneurship with its potential to set the economy on a higher growth path by 
supplying the products which consumers need and want, creating new employment 
opportunities, and introducing new and more efficient technologies of production. But 
to what extent can we expect to see entrepreneurs in China behaving like their 
counterparts in the advanced industrial economies of Western Europe, Japan, and 
the United States? This is the question we address in this chapter. In our view, the 
reform programme has, indeed, opened up new opportunities for private enterprise 
activity; but idiosyncrasies of the business environment are at the same time 
generating novel institutional arrangements in support of entrepreneurs’ investments. 
We agree, therefore, with Herrick and Kindleberger when they assert that 
“Development ought not to be viewed as a monotonic, stylized path, ever onward 
and upward, historically established and invariably repeated” (1983, p.62).  
 
In this chapter, we analyse modes of entrepreneurship in one particular province, 
Shanxi, which lies to the north-east of Beijing. We claim that six idiosyncratic 
features of the business environment generate a particularly high level of economic 
and institutional uncertainty for would-be entrepreneurs in this province; these are: 
 a dual economy 
 missing and poorly functioning markets 
 poorly developed institutional arrangements 
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 incomplete private property rights 
 a weak regulatory regime 
 and the ‘newness’ of private enterprise. 
We suggest that the high transaction costs associated with uncertainty, together with 
resource constraints, are responsible for pushing entrepreneurs into alliances with 
others. This is because alliances raise the probability of success and the expected 
level of profits in the new private sector. Under these conditions, the establishment of 
a firm and its expansion path turn on the ability of the entrepreneur to identify, and 
form alliances with, the ‘right’ kind of others. 
 
Our account is supported by 27 case studies of entrepreneurs acquired through 
fieldwork in Shanxi Province in 1999. The age and principal productive activities of 
respondents are described in Table 1 (in the Appendices). Shanxi Province was 
selected for fieldwork because it has an extremely fast-growing private sector but 
has not been a major recipient of foreign direct investment or preferential treatment 
by the State. Growth has therefore been endogenous. Interviews were semi-
structured and lasted for at least two hours (and sometimes much longer) with the 
aim of capturing qualitative data1. It cannot be claimed that the sample of 
respondents is representative by the usual social-scientific standards of Western 
research practice since we were dependent for access to entrepreneurs on three 
mediating agencies: the principal commercial bank of the region, a university in the 
provincial capital, and local Party officials; each of these agencies is likely to have 
applied their own filters to the sample. The alternative would have been to wait for 
the time it takes for Western sampling methods to be acceptable and practicable. 
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Nonetheless, we suggest the resulting dataset is rich in information and offers a 
unique glimpse of key features of entrepreneurship in Shanxi Province at this stage 
of the reform programme. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the particular features of 
uncertainty which characterise the business environment and which generate high 
transaction costs for would-be entrepreneurs. Section 3 describes the impact of 
uncertainty on profit, investment and product mix. Section 4 develops the claim that 
high transaction costs, together with resource constraints, push entrepreneurs into 
alliances with others. And Section 5 concludes with a discussion of some of the 
ramifications of our findings. To add substance to our claims, the Appendices contain 
short case studies of four representative entrepreneurs. 
 
2.0 THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT. 
The economic, social and political environment facing a potential entrepreneur in the 
newly reformed China has distinct transaction cost-generating features. These 
features need to be regarded as inter-related but, for expositional purposes, they can 
be described under the following six headings. 
 
2.1 The dual economy 
China is characterised by the co-existence of a socialist sector where economic 
activity continues in large part to be coordinated by centrally-planned quotas and low 
state-controlled prices, and a competitive, free-enterprise sector where activity is 
coordinated by the price mechanism with (relatively) free entry to private 
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entrepreneurs. Producers would face far less uncertainty if just one sector 
predominated, and if that sector manifested some stability. As it is, both the socialist 
sector and the free-enterprise sector are in a state of flux. Negotiating the divide 
between sectors is a primary source of transaction costs since time and money must 
be spent cultivating access to, and good relations with, those bureaucrats and Party 
officials in the state sector who have control over key resources. But success has 
high rewards: an individual who succeeds in buying inputs at low state prices while 
selling their own goods in competitive markets can appropriate the profits accruing to 
arbitrage (Nee & Matthews, 1996; Nee & Su, 1990; Nee, 2000).  
 
2.2 Missing and poorly functioning markets 
The emerging market situation in China is characterised at best by poorly functioning 
markets, and at worst by missing markets, for capital funds, other factor inputs, risk 
management, and information of all kinds (Stigler, 1989; Boisot, 1995). This situation 
necessarily adds to the costs of undertaking transactions.  
 
Commercial banks, for example, simply do not have sufficient capital available to 
meet the needs of all budding and actual entrepreneurs, nor are they practised in 
assessing the risks and managing the insurance associated with all the novel 
ventures presented to them. Banks are not the only source of capital; but locating 
other sources is difficult for would-be entrepreneurs. Information relating to the 
availability, price and location of other inputs to production (for example, 
appropriately skilled labour and intermediate goods) is similarly either lacking 
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altogether or disaggregated. All of the 27 entrepreneurs whom we interviewed spoke 
of the inadequacy of the services provided by commercial banks, and/or described 
access to capital, appropriately skilled labour, and information as key problem 
areas2. 
 
However, on the positive side, the newly unleashed desire for consumption in China 
means that an individual can earn high profits if they can acquire access to factor 
inputs and can identify ways of establishing business relations across markets and 
provinces. A budding entrepreneur, then, faces high deterrents to market entry but, 
also, robust incentives to succeed. 
 
2.3 Poorly developed institutional arrangements 
China is short of the kind of public and private sector agencies which are found in 
plentiful supply in a mature industrial economy and which support the coordination of 
market activity; these include employment agencies, law and accountancy firms, 
commercial banks, insurance agencies, and chambers of commerce. Islam and 
Chowdhury (1997), for example, report that there are only 75,000 lawyers and 6,000 
law firms across China. In economies with a long experience of private sector 
production, these agencies act as repositories of information and expertise, and as 
intermediaries in the negotiations between potential business partners. But where 
they exist in China, the experience of personnel, and the information and other 
resources available to them, are severely limited.  
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The demand for intermediaries is high; as one of our respondents pointed out, China 
has an inadequate capital base and intermediaries are needed to locate sources of 
capital and to broker agreements. New agencies are, indeed, evolving and they 
resemble their counterparts in the West in terms of their structure and organisation, 
and the services they seek to supply. And, certainly, through their activities a range 
of quasi- institutional business arrangements has been engendered, such as laws 
and legal precedents, accountancy procedures, capital markets, and guidelines for 
business practice. As such, the new agencies would appear to contribute to a 
reduction of the transaction costs associated with the management of risk, the 
acquisition of capital funds, the enforcement of contracts, and the dissemination of  
information. However, they are inadequate to the task of lubricating the wheels of 
private enterprise. Since the arrangements engendered by the new agencies do not 
emanate from the State at its centre, their status is undetermined and at best 
equivocal, particularly where transactors seek to cross provincial boundaries. And 
since the experience of personnel is limited, and the coverage of exchange relations 
is incomplete, the capacity of the new agencies to broker and subsequently to 
enforce the wide range of novel transactions is commonly recognised by 
entrepreneurs to lack substance. 

2.4 Incomplete private property rights 
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In the period 1980-84, legislation was introduced to establish private property rights 
as a way of supporting private enterprise activity. For the first time in recent history, 
individuals and enterprises of various kinds now find they can have lawful private 
ownership of both physical and financial assets. Under the legislation, the State 
guarantees that asset holders can exclude others from use of the same asset. In 
the Western legal sense, this guarantee does not constitute a complete private 
property right, but a possessory right (Furubotn & Pejovich, 1974; Posner, 1980; 
Fukuyama, 1995), which is legally binding only when resources are used within the 
politically defined market sector and where effective law enforcement agencies 
exist3. Despite these limitations, the legislation has had the desired effect on 
investment by raising the expectations of individuals that they can appropriate the 
returns to their ventures.  
 
The impetus to invest is evident both in urban areas where the state manufacturing 
sector is concentrated and in the countryside. In the case of the former, a variety of 
state agencies are taking advantage of their new-found entitlement to become the 
lawful owners of physical and financial assets. In the case of the latter, the village 
has been established as the natural owner of all assets within village boundaries, 
with the further assignment of private property rights to individuals taking place 
contingent on negotiations within the village or its next superior administrative unit 
(Rozelle & Li, 1998). Three procedures have come to dominate the transfer of assets 
into private hands.  
 
First, control over resources and possession is commonly recognised as the first 
step towards the acquisition of private property rights. This procedure can be thought 
of as one of cold privatisation; it is the means by which state cadres previously in 
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control of resources are able to transform themselves into the managers, if not the 
owners, of those resources. The second procedure is to acknowledge past 
investment into a resource. Thus, land which hitherto was farmed by a group of 
households under the Peoples Commune System is apportioned and assigned to 
private households within that original group. However, at its best, this second 
procedure secures sharecropping and similar lease contracts while full, legally-
enforceable private property rights are still missing. From the early 1990s, a third 
procedure has emerged. Those entrepreneurs seeking to acquire land without some 
original association with it, have been permitted to purchase a lease, if local 
politicians and Party cadres are pliant and sanction the use to which the land will be 
put. However, security of tenure beyond the period specified in the lease, the right to 
change of use, and the right to transfer ownership, remain uncertain.  
 
It is true to say, then, that opportunities for private enterprise activity have, indeed, 
expanded with the introduction of private property rights. But procedures for the 
assignment of rights to individuals mean that bureaucrats, Party cadres, and other 
local politicians continue as a force to be reckoned with in determining who can do 
what with land which is in private hands (Oi, 1996; Unger, 1995).  
 
2.5  A weak regulatory regime 
The reform process in China has been characterised by on-going shifts in the 
regulatory regime across a number of dimensions.  
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While regulations are negotiated and agreed in the first instance at the centre in 
Beijing, China is de facto a decentralised (that is, federalist) state in that each locality 
enjoys the leeway to modify, manipulate - and even create - its own regulatory 
regime. As a consequence, entrepreneurs do not face a unified system of taxes, 
laws and regulations but a variety of systems which differ from province to province 
and, sometimes, even from county to county within a single province. The 
heterogeneity of systems, and their lack of stability, adds to the uncertainties 
associated with production and exchange, particularly where entrepreneurs seek to 
transact across provinces. At the same time, within a locality, the regulatory regime 
is experienced as a soft and eminently malleable constraint on economic activity, 
with the tax base, the tax rate, and the application of regulations open to negotiation 
- at least, to those with influence. As Oi (ibid) observes: Local officials routinely 
manipulate regulations to allow local enterprises to receive the maximum tax 
advantages and exemptions. This keeps more revenue within the locality and adds 
to the competitive advantage of the enterprises, which also means that of the 
locality. ... [the county tax bureau] may also use its connections to influence other 
agencies, such as banks, to bend the rules in favour of a particular enterprise. 
(P.184). 
 
Despite encouragement of private enterprise from the State at its centre, and despite 
advances in the assignment of private property rights, economic activity continues to 
take place under considerable risk of confiscation as a result of opportunism and/or 
where private enterprise is frowned upon by the local political leadership. In the early 
days of the reform programme, confiscation involved the seizure of physical assets 
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or bank accounts from private firms or households; more recently, it can take the 
form of ad hoc taxation once net profits are known, and can involve the sudden 
appearance of Party cadres on the doorstep asking for a share of the returns (Krug, 
1997; Gambetta, 1993; Boisot & Child, 1988). During fieldwork, respondents 
provided enough anecdotal evidence to suggest that ad hoc systems of taxation, or 
invitations to contribute to local community facilities, are a real threat. 
 
The risk of confiscation of assets, together with the malleability of the regulatory 
regime, has implications, not only for the conduct and performance of private 
enterprise once it is up and running, but at the planning stage when the decision is 
taken about whether or not to proceed with a business venture. Arguably one of the 
most dramatic differences between the business environments to be found in China 
and in the mature economies of the West is that the expected returns to an 
investment cannot be calculated solely by reference to economic parameters: the 
political climate, and the control of local politicians over the regulatory regime, both 
have to be taken into account.  As one of our respondents remarked, Everything 
depends on the government.  
 
2.6 The newness of private enterprise 
Private enterprise activity is still relatively novel in China and so the very newness of 
the private firm as an organisational form generates a high level of uncertainty for 
would-be entrepreneurs (Krug & Polos, 2000). There are several dimensions to this 
kind of uncertainty.  
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First, budding entrepreneurs are endowed with a low level of expertise with regard to 
the organisation of production and the management of the private firm. However 
enthusiastic the current generation is to embrace private enterprise, the formal 
education they received did not equip them with the expertise and acumen which 
might be thought necessary for sound business practice in a market environment.  
There is little awareness of the mechanics of demand and supply, and price- and 
income elasticities, even at an intuitive level, and there is no systematic knowledge 
base which could help entrepreneurs to identify, and subsequently to quantify, the 
risks associated with their ventures. Second, the newness of the private sector 
means business practices are heterogeneous. Thus, there is no obvious model of 
best practice to imitate and there are no standardised routines of business practice 
which entrepreneurs can rely on for the smooth passage of transactions. And, finally, 
in the absence of a history of experience of business strategy, there is no collective 
memory about what can go wrong and how to resolve problems when they arise.   
 
Chinese entrepreneurs have robust incentives to succeed in 
their private sector business activities. There is growing domestic demand for final 
and intermediate goods, a low level of competition from indigenous suppliers in most 
markets, and (as yet) relatively poor penetration of markets by foreign firms. Yet the 
six features of the economy we have described in this section all point to a high level 
of institutional uncertainty. We use this term in order to emphasize two facets of the 
business environment which potentially constrain entrepreneurial activity. First, weak 
institutions are unable to reduce uncertainty in the business environment to the level 
2.7 Institutional uncertainty 
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experienced by entrepreneurs in a more mature market economy. And, second, the 
very co-existence of a multiplicity of different institutional forms and practices, many 
of which are in flux, is a source of uncertainty itself.  
 
Under these conditions, the transaction costs accompanying production and 
exchange relations are high, and mistakes are expensive. In particular, customer 
and supplier firms, employees, and other business partners cannot be expected to 
act according to well-established and, hence, predictable patterns of behaviour, as 
they might in a more mature and stable environment. The rational entrepreneur can 
therefore expect instead to elicit a large variance in the responses of economic 
agents to his or her actions, and a large variance in the responses of business 
partners to external shocks (Stinchcombe, 1965). Moreover, while the potential 
exists for costly principal-agent problems (that is, the problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard), it is not within an entrepreneurs power to enforce a specific kind 
of behaviour since social and legal mechanisms of enforcement are unstable, can 
change rapidly over time, and are likely to vary from one locality to another. What do 
these factors imply for the practice of entrepreneurship? 
 
3.0 THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY ON PROFIT, PRODUCT MIX AND 
INVESTMENT. 
Fieldwork reveals that entrepreneurs are keen to ensure their investments will 
generate a steady stream of profits over time. This objective translates into the 
pursuit of long-term business relations in factor and product markets in order to 
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minimise the risks of opportunism and to transcend the mere ‘wheeling and dealing’ 
of spot markets4. In these respects, the aspirations of entrepreneurs in China are 
similar to those of their counterparts elsewhere (Sako, 1992; Lyons & Mehta, 1997). 
But as we have already observed, it is particularly difficult in China to assess the 
level of risk associated with a business venture: is this the right product of the right 
quality? will the market prove to be profitable? how should costs and revenues be 
calculated? can business partners be relied upon to abstain from opportunism? will 
local government approve of the enterprise, or frustrate it? how secure are profits 
and assets? These economic and institutional uncertainties have ramifications for 
the behaviour of actual and potential entrepreneurs. 
 
3.1 The Relationship between uncertainty and profit 
High uncertainty in the business environment means it would be rational for potential 
entrepreneurs to expect a large variance in the profits from their business ventures. 
Consequently, all but those who are the most adventurous, imaginative and risk-
loving will be eliminated from the subset of those who actually proceed to production. 
It follows that any action on the part of the potential entrepreneur which results in 
less uncertainty will increase the expected net returns to a venture and reduce the 
variance in residual profit, thereby lowering the boundary on entrepreneurship.  This 
being the case, we may predict that the set of actual entrepreneurs will only include 
those who are best placed to reduce the level of economic and institutional 
uncertainty. 
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But success in production also confers a positive externality on the wider population 
of potential entrepreneurs in an evolutionary fashion (Nelson, 1996 and 1997). 
Ceteris paribus, the larger the number of private firms which become established in 
an emergent market, the better that market functions for all its actual and potential 
participants, both on the supply side and the demand side. Once again, the 
boundary on entrepreneurship is lowered. Not only do prices and profits begin to act 
as reliable signals, but successful entrepreneurship adds to the knowledge base of 
the economy and offers new models of behaviour to be imitated. Success also 
exposes new opportunities to supply which, if exploited, generate efficiency gains 
and raise profit margins. Thus, the market may reach a point where for certain inputs 
it becomes efficient to switch from the internal hierarchy of the firm to new sources of 
supply. In other words, as factor and final goods markets become established 
through successful entrepreneurship, it may be expected that the gains to 
specialisation associated with an increasing division of labour can be realised. Given 
the early stage of the reform process, it will be some time before markets are so 
competitive that profit margins start to be squeezed5. Thus, success in 
entrepreneurship simply adds to the opportunity set faced by the population of 
would-be entrepreneurs (Nelson, 1996). 
 
3.2 The relationship between uncertainty and product mix 
In a situation of emergent markets and where there are political as well as economic 
uncertainties, two special risks attach to the concentration of activity on a single 
product which call for special kinds of insurance. First, through a combination of poor 
information, miscalculation, and insufficient expertise, an entrepreneur may find 
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themselves operating at the margin where they are at risk of being driven out of the 
market, for example, where start-up costs have been under-estimated, revenues are 
less than expected, or the wrong product has been produced. Second, unanticipated 
changes in the political climate or to the regulatory regime can quickly change 
business conditions for the worse in a particular market or locality; for example, an 
entrepreneur may suddenly find their personal and corporate assets at risk of 
confiscation or actually confiscated.  Under these conditions, it becomes rational to 
consider not only current but future options on business activity by creating and 
maintaining a portfolio of real options, that is, a wide-ranging set of production 
possibilities such that resources can be diverted to additional or alternative activities 
at minimum cost  and at the optimal moment (Jin, 1996; Trigeorgis, 1993).  
 
The attention given by entrepreneurs to current and future production possibilities is 
exemplified by the perplexity of respondents when asked to specify their core 
business activity. The notion of core competence turned out to be irrelevant to 
respondents in deciding which activities to engage in. For the most part, a firm is 
known, not by what it produces, but by who stands behind it, and that individual will 
seize on any profitable opportunity which presents itself, with scant regard for any 
core competence the firm may, or may not, have. Case Number 16, for example, 
began his career in the private sector selling colour television sets and subsequently 
moved into car and motorcycle sales, real estate, brick production, and the 
recreational services sector; and Case Number 17 began in the coal and iron 
industry and expanded into biological engineering and the supply of biological 
products. 
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 3.3 The relationship between uncertainty and investment 
Institutional uncertainty also has implications for the forms taken by investment. 
Fieldwork reveals that a rational entrepreneur will invest in forms of capital which 
enhance the ability to move rapidly from one sector to another, or from one locality to 
another, without the loss of large sunk costs. It might be argued that a necessary 
requirement for the building up of a core business is tradeable input; but as long 
as a wide range of inputs cannot be safely traded due to the weakness of private 
property rights and an unstable political climate, a firm needs to exploit any valuable 
asset it happens to possess. Thus, unlike the modern Western-style firm which tends 
to concentrate investment on firm-specific or product-specific know-how, 
entrepreneurs in Shanxi concentrate their investment on transferable assets. And the 
single most transferable asset which the entrepreneur has is him/herself and their 
social capital in the form of the ability to mobilise allegiances.  
 
The assets which are embedded in the person of the entrepreneur are secure from 
confiscation which means they can easily be transferred into alternative income-
generating activities and from one locality to another. This facet of successful 
entrepreneurship can explain why most of the individuals encountered in fieldwork 
were endowed with wide-ranging personal attributes or endowments, such as charm, 
charisma, and persuasiveness, as well as intelligence, adaptability and imagination; 
these attributes are immensely valuable in securing cooperation with others. As we 
shall see below, it is the ability of the entrepreneur to form alliances, and the 
subsequent rents from cooperation, which are crucial to the establishment and on-
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going profitability of firms. Thus, success in entrepreneurship calls for more than a 
bright idea, a good product, and the willingness to accept risk. Without heavy 
investment in the kind of alliances which minimise transaction costs, the future of the 
firm will always be in serious jeopardy.  
 
 4.0 ALLIANCES.  
It was not until 1994 that banks would give loans to private entrepreneurs and, as we 
have seen, even now capital markets are poorly developed and supported by an 
inadequate capital base. Yet obtaining access to financial capital, while clearly 
important, is not the crucial element in successful entrepreneurship. The potential 
entrepreneur begins their career in the private sector with a small personal 
endowment, the single most valuable component of which is his or her social 
capital6. This is because the key to success in entrepreneurship is access to 
resources. At this stage of the reform process in which information is disaggregated, 
contractual security is weak, and the assignment of private property rights is 
incomplete, the ability to gain access to resources translates into the ability of the 
entrepreneur to locate, and then to affiliate themselves with those with whom there 
exists the potential to reap mutual benefits. The Western concept of 
entrepreneurship is focused on the ability of the individual to identify profitable 
opportunities (Kirzner, 1973 and 1985). But, in China, the key factor in successful 
entrepreneurship is the ability to form an alliance with those economic agents who 
possess or control the financial assets, physical assets, or specific human capital  
needed for brokering market entry, that is, for starting production, securing supply, 
and gaining access to distribution channels (Cheng & Rosett, 1991; Nee, 1989; 
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Boisot, 1995). These alliances render value to the budding entrepreneur, not only by 
making production possible in the first instance, but by reducing the level of risk and 
increasing the expected net returns to a venture.    
 
First, the difficulties associated with the dual economy can be overcome by the 
entrepreneur if entry to the erstwhile socialist sector can be secured. This translates 
into the need to form an alliance with those politicians or bureaucrats who control 
entry to the socialist sector. Entry can then be secured through a series of bribes or 
a share of the profits to a venture, or some other mutually beneficial exchange.  
Second, the difficulties associated with weak institutional arrangements can be 
overcome by forming an alliance with those able to promote and sustain a stable 
business environment. This can be understood as a form of private collective action. 
An effective alliance has four transaction cost-saving properties in this respect:  
(i) It provides access to insider information which allows the 
entrepreneur to anticipate changes in the regulatory framework, and to 
acquire information relating to factor and final goods markets.  
 
(ii) By generating its own influential codes of behaviour, the effective 
alliance is able to supplement the inadequate legal system with social 
and political sanctioning thereby providing a higher level of contractual 
security than would otherwise be the case. 
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(iii) The effective alliance provides room for experimentation in two 
ways: it ensures that an entrepreneur can fail once yet return for a 
second attempt, and it forms a buffer against failure in the first 
instance. 
 
(iv) The effective alliance imparts a positive externality: it acts as a form 
of collective memory, ensuring that a single failure need not be 
constituted simply as one individuals loss of investment but as an 
experience which others can learn from.  
 
Numbers count in the performance of these transaction cost-saving tasks: the 
greater the number of economic agents who participate in the alliance, the more 
effective it will be in the dissemination of information, the management of risk, and 
the monitoring and sanctioning of business practice. With these significant benefits 
at stake, the fortunes of the entrepreneur are heavily dependent on their ability to 
form alliances with bureaucrats, political leaders and other significant parties in the 
business environment.  
 
Third and finally, the ability to form the right kind of alliances can mitigate the 
transaction costs associated with the newness of private enterprise. The problems 
associated with newness include not only missing institutions, such as the banking 
services or tort laws which normally support private sector exchanges, but also 
missing business practices, such as the norms, conventions and routines which 
determine how things are done. These practices constitute a form of tacit 
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knowledge which is present in the mature economy but missing in the newly 
reformed China. The effective alliance performs a crucial role in the development of 
tacit knowledge by creating and promoting a stable set of expectations of good 
business behaviour. Once again, numbers matter: the greater the number of 
economic agents who have internalised the same practices of behaviour, the more 
smoothly and efficiently can business be transacted and the lower the monitoring 
costs. Conversely, the more heterogeneous the business environment is (that is, the 
more different practices that co-exist), the higher the transaction costs because each 
new exchange relation must be negotiated afresh to avoid misunderstandings and 
ambiguities. Entrepreneurs in China are aware of heterogeneities in their business 
environment; as several of our respondents indicated, they expect people from other 
regions to behave differently, and even to speak in dialects they cannot understand. 
And they are sensitive to the need to create mechanisms to deal with difference, 
chief of which is the alliance of like-minded individuals who see the value of 
establishing common practices.  
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION. 
We have suggested that entrepreneurial success in Shanxi turns crucially on a 
system of alliances. This system can be understood as a means of creating and 
mobilising the economic, social and political capital required to lubricate the wheels 
of private enterprise in an environment characterised by a high level of economic 
and institutional uncertainty. Within this system, the identities and personal attributes 
of individuals are key elements, which would explain why we observe a large number 
of firms with weak organisational identities combined with the high exposure and 
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strong personal charisma of the owner. The right kind of alliances help to overcome 
resource constraints and to minimise transaction costs through the pooling of both 
tangible and intangible assets, the spreading of risk, the monitoring and enforcement 
of business deals, and the creation of a stable business environment. Alliances are 
also valuable because they offer patronage and trust-generating mechanisms, and 
because they reduce search costs. Thus, alliances function as a repository of 
knowledge about business opportunities and the location of human resources. 
 
This account of entrepreneurship is distinctive in that it raises the profile of the 
processes which take place prior to the establishment of the firm and downplays the 
significance of the production function in its subsequent behaviour. In contrast, the 
Western-style neoclassical account, which only begins with a production function, 
and which presupposes that it is economic factors alone which determine the 
activities of the firm, is inadequate to the task of modelling behaviour. The 
neoclassicals model has been criticised in the West by institutional economists, and 
by managerial and behavioural theorists, for its treatment of the firm as a black box’ 
(Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Furubotn & Pejovich, ibid; Granovetter, 1985; Pratten, 
1997; Williamson, 1993). The criticism is particularly apt in China where personal 
identities and the broader architecture of the business environment are crucial 
factors in the determination of productive activities and the level of profits. 
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Our account is supported by fieldwork which reveals that entrepreneurs are 
discriminating in their choice of who to form an alliance with and seek out those who 
offer the highest expected returns. It follows that the expansion path of firms is driven 
by differential access to alliances; for example, if an entrepreneur has access to 
alliances which can broker influence in the state sector, he or she is likely to move 
into productive activities where bureaucratic controls are greatest. In other words, 
the forms taken by social capital are a driving force in the development of the private 
sector. 
 
Fieldwork also reveals, in contrast to claims in the literature (Redding, 1996; 
Fukuyama, ibid), that the family does not play a major and on-going role in the firm. 
In those cases where a member of the family had given a loan, it was repaid as 
rapidly as possible, and we came across no instances of a loan being accompanied 
by legal entitlement to a share in either the risks or the profits associated with the 
venture. Moreover, a loan did not grant authority in decision-making. These features 
indicate that neither party regards the loan as an investment and, hence, that the 
family cannot be regarded as a capital-pooling institution.  
 
Given the role of alliances, why is it that entrepreneurship in China has not become 
prone to the business practices to be found in the countries of the old Soviet Union 
and, in particular, of Russia, where a single alliance - the Mafia - predominates? Our 
fieldwork to date has been restricted to one province only and so we can only 
speculate as to the answer.  
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One local explanation may be that Shanxi province was traditionally dominated by 
state-run heavy industry, notably in coal; this history has bequeathed powerful 
alliances centred on the Party. Our fieldwork certainly provides evidence of the 
influential role of Party cadres and other local officials in private enterprise activity, a 
practice described by Oi (ibid) as local state corporatism. We would also suggest 
that under the conditions we have described in Section 2, the mutual gains to 
cooperation are highest in the presence of a multiplicity of alliances and where there 
is an element of competition between alliances. This being the case, individuals and 
alliances have no incentive to see a single alliance (such as the Mafia) rise to 
dominance or to limit their allegiance to a single alliance. Certainly, our fieldwork in 
Shanxi province suggests that no single alliance has the monopoly on all business 
transactions and that competition between alliances is characterised by a form of 
product differentiation. Ex-army colleagues, for example, specialise in their ability 
to locate certain kinds of qualified labour and thus provide a pool for engineering and 
mining skills and expertise with chemicals. We also came across evidence of the 
part played by alumni clubs  in providing access to distribution channels; for 
example, networks of old classmates were used as reliable contacts by two 
respondents wanting to market products in distant provinces. Entrepreneurs, for their 
part, face strong incentives to gain entry to more than one alliance but, because of 
the positive costs of entry, to be discriminating; they would appear to seek out the 
combination of alliances which promises the highest returns on membership, 
rejecting those they have no use for. Of course, it remains to be seen if this system 
will survive further stages in the transition process.   
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In venturing these claims, we do not suggest that cultural difference is the single 
most important factor in explaining the forms taken by entrepreneurship in different 
environments 7. We would argue instead that it is the nature, level and source of 
uncertainty which determines the particular way in which private markets and their 
associated institutional practices emerge. Clearly, further comparative work 
elsewhere in China is needed in order to develop this thesis. But, certainly, our 
fieldwork so far points to flaws in the neoclassical framework which takes the 
already-existing firm as the unit of analysis and begins its story there. In our view, a 
deeper understanding of entrepreneurship may be acquired by treating the firm and 
its expansion path as an evolutionary process in which the conditions for success 
and failure are laid down well before an actual firm comes into being. 
 
  
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ENDNOTES 
1. A copy of the interview schedule is available from the authors on request. 
 
2. The seriousness of these problems was openly acknowledged by the senior 
representative of one of the largest banks in the province who introduced us to many 
of our respondents. 
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3. According to standard economic theory, complete private property rights require a 
bundle of rights over a good to be defined. Thus, a good is private property if there 
is: the exclusive right of use, implying the right to exclude others; the exclusive right 
to receive any income generated by the good; the right to change the form and 
substance of the good; and the right to transfer ownership. In addition, the 
transaction costs associated with the enforcement of rights through the courts must 
be zero or sufficiently low to ensure the pursuit of enforcement is worthwhile. Any 
divergence from these conditions means that economic agents are unable to realize 
the full value of their property and, hence, there is a diminishment of the incentive to 
invest in production. 
 
4. While the wheeling and dealing which takes place in spot markets constitutes a 
form of private enterprise, it may be regarded as conceptually distinct from the more 
enduring forms of business activity which characterise entrepreneurship and which 
involve the establishment of a firm and capital accumulation. 
 
5. The profit margins of several respondents were protected by a strong position 
resulting from a first-mover advantage and/or a total monopoly of the market. When 
asked whether new entry would place the firm in jeopardy, 16 (59%) respondents 
answered positively, but only two respondents were actually facing new competition, 
and one further respondent said he would actually welcome new competition 
because of the benefits in terms of new technology and ideas. However, we suggest 
a more significant finding is that new entry is universally seen as a less important 
factor in success than government policy and local Party attitudes with respect to 
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private enterprise. One entrepreneur, for example, pointed out that his firm’s control 
of the market was directly attributable to local government protection. Another 
respondent said that a barrier to the entry of foreign-owned enterprise into his market 
(biological engineering products) was created by a central government policy of 
import-substitution; since this policy was actively supported by the Academy of 
Sciences, the crucial factor in this firms success was perceived to be the 
maintenance of good relations with the Academy. 
 
6.   One respondent made an explicit distinction between financial and social 
capital. 
 
7.   The claim that Chinese culture is the driving force behind the emergence of 
network capitalism is discussed in Boisot & Child (1988 and 1999). 
 
  
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APPENDICES 
 
TABLE 1: Age and Principal Private Sector Activities of Respondents 
 
 
CASE 
NO. 
 
 
AGE 
 
 
PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECTOR ACTIVITIES 
 
   01 
 
 36 
 
wholesale supply of electrical appliances for bakeries, retail sale of 
electrical appliances & furniture 
 
   02 
 
 33 
 
wholesale & retail supply of cars & low-quality pick-up trucks 
 
   03 
 
 35 
 
retail supply of high-quality cars 
 
   04 
 
 38 
 
wholesale & retail sale of truck tyres; in-house production of metal 
rims for tyres 
 
   05 
 
 30 
 
production of chemicals  
 
   06 
 
 42 
 
production of heating boilers & air conditioning systems; wholesale 
supply of digital televisions 
 
   07 
 
 47 
 
breeding & cultivation of seed; wholesale & retail seed merchant 
 
   08 
 
 46 
 
wholesale supply of food additives 
 
   09 
 
 33 
 
design & supply of intelligent buildings; supply of hardware & 
software engineering services; wholesale & retail supply of office & 
communications equipment 
 
   10 
 
 45 
 
chain of supermarkets; wholesale supplier of specialist noodles 
 
   11 
 
 49 
 
photographer 
 
   12 
 
 34 
 
restaurants; production of industrial coal & pig iron; trade in coal, 
iron & minerals 
 
   13 
 
 48 
 
manufacture of gold & silver jewellery, & tourist souvenirs 
 
   14 
 
 37 
 
import & sale of textiles; retail sale of electronic equipment; car 
repair shop; hotel & restaurant services; advertising services 
 
   15 
 
 43 
 
real estate; construction 
 
   16 
 
 35 
 
retail supply of cars & motor cycles; real estate; brick production; 
supply of recreational facilities 
 
   17 
 
 
c.35 
 
trade in coal & iron; production of biological engineering products 
 
   18 
 
 40 
 
educational services (private school for children aged 5+) 
 
   19 
 
 45 
 
production of aluminium & electrolysis processors; aluminium 
 
 33 
processing & plating 
 
   20 
 
 36 
 
boiler repair shop; design & production of boilers 
 
   21 
 
 38 
 
production of preserved fruit & fruit products, & soft drinks 
 
   22 
 
 67 
 
production of iron moulds, cast-iron clamps, & zinc-plated fittings & 
machinery 
 
   23 
 
 50 
 
manufacture of pigments 
 
   24 
 
 
c.50 
 
manufacture of cast-iron fittings 
 
   25 
 
 49 
 
manufacture of cast-iron fittings 
 
   26 
 
 37 
 
coal-mining; iron & coal traders 
 
   27 
 
 37 
 
retail sale of sportswear & sports equipment 
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FOUR ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDIES 
 
Note: Respondents’ names have been changed to protect their anonymity. 
Case study 1: Mr. Chen 
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 Mr. Chen is 37, He is Chairman of the Board of a large group of companies 
with 1500 employees. He began his career in the private sector in 1986 with 
the import and sale of textiles using personal savings of RMB. 5000 (about 
400 at current exchange rates). He formed an unregistered (that is, unofficial) 
private company in 1989 when he established a small electronic equipment 
shop, followed by a car repair shop in 1991. Since then, his company has 
expanded rapidly to embrace: the distribution and sale of car parts and 
accessories; a car customisation service; the manufacture of car parts; car 
importation; car rental; hotel & restaurant services; and advertising services. 
The major source of capital to fund expansion has been a group of 100 
partners; but Mr. Chen is the big boss (as one of his aides describes 
him); he has a charismatic personality, takes all major decisions himself, and 
commands complete loyalty. With his success, the capital offered by banks to 
Mr. Chen has increased (I could get RMB 20m easily) such that about 30% 
of current assets are in the form of bank debt; but Mr. Chen uses a network of 
different banks so they have to compete for me. 
 
Mr. Chen has use rights of the land on which his buildings are located; 
these can be purchased for 50 years at a time. Mr. Chen states that the kind 
of use to which the land is put is vulnerable to political intervention at any 
time, but he says he is confident that, with his connections and influence, 
intervention is unlikely. 
 
Mr. Chen’s business deals are accompanied by written agreements; but he 
says that trust and cooperation, supported by his personal reputation, 
conventions of business practice (which Mr. Chen has played a part in 
establishing), and the size and robust market position of the company are 
primary factors in enforcing the good behaviour of business partners. 
 
Mr. Chen is a key figure in the development of the private sector, both in 
Shanxi Province and beyond. He says he travels frequently to Beijing and the 
US to maintain his contacts. He is vice-president of his local Association of 
Industry & Commerce; he is a Member of a Youth Enterprise Association (with 
links to local schools and training organizations), the Council of Private 
Enterprise, the Automobile Engineering Institute, and a Gentlemens Club 
(which meets in his hotel). Mr. Chen describes his relationships with state-
controlled firms, a variety of other firms, and the village community as 
important to his success; but he describes his relationships with key 
individuals as essential. Mr. Chen is well connected to the Party: If theres a 
policy problem, well ask the government for help and urge them to modify 
their policy. A key tool of leverage is his willingness to pay taxes and the 
large amount paid. 
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Case study 2: Mr. Wang  
Mr. Wang is a graduate of the prestigious Shanghai University. In 1992, he 
opened a small restaurant with personal savings of RMB. 10,000 (about 800) 
enabling him to save a further RMB. 100,000 with which he opened a larger 
restaurant. Mr. Wang observes that the mid-1990s saw an increase in the 
level of uncertainty in the sector and so he diverted his resources into the 
production of industrial coal and pig-iron when he saw an opportunity for entry 
into this erstwhile state-monopolised sector. His brother helped with a loan. 
Mr.Wang says that his brother had already formed a private firm offering 
taxation services, and he transferred his business networks and debts to 
Mr Wangs firm. All loans and debts incurred via the brother were rapidly 
repaid from profits. Mr. Wang says that his major problem with expansion has 
been gaining access to capital funds at the right time. Mr. Wang now has 250 
employees the majority of whom he says he picks up as excess labour from 
the state-controlled sector. Employees receive generous wages as a reward 
to good performance, but also in bad times to encourage them. Mr. Wang 
says that he particularly values their willingness to alert him to investment 
opportunities. 
 
Mr. Wang faces serious problems in obtaining enough land to meet his 
expansion plans, and insecurity in its use as a result of poorly defined land 
rights. 
 
Mr. Wang’s business deals are supported by verbal agreements. He observes 
that monitoring is easy because most products are standardised, but that 
mutual trust, cooperation, and flexibility, together with his personal reputation 
and honesty, are vital to the success of his ventures. 
 
Mr. Wang says that his relationships with firms and individuals in the state 
sector are vital to his success since he is dependent on them for access to 
key resources and for market entry; for their part, the state-owned enterprises 
must barter for Mr Wang’s products due to lack of cash. He says he is also 
dependent on good relations with township governments, village heads, and 
villagers in the areas where his factories are located since otherwise they 
will cause trouble over land use and transport issues. Mr Wang says his 
relationship with his brother was essential when he first began as an 
entrepreneur because he was deemed to be an outsider as a result of his 
period in Shanghai; this connection is less important now that I have 
established my own networks. He says that township and village enterprises 
are important customers; these are linked into a network and, since it is the 
network with which he conducts business, his personal reputation and 
connectedness within this network are vital to the success of his 
transactions.  
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Case study 3: Mr. Xiang.  
Mr. Xiang is 67. His firm was originally the state-owned enterprise which 
employed him for most of his life and which was founded in 1957 with 6 
employees. Mr. Xiang recounts how ten months ago, the firm was bought out 
by its 45 managers, each of whom had a small amount of personal savings; 
but Mr Xiang is the largest shareholder (with 60% of shares) and the principal 
decision-maker. The firm now has more than 1000 employees, most of whom 
had been discarded by state-owned factories in the locality. The firm produces 
iron moulds, cast-iron clamps, and zinc-plated fittings and machinery, which 
are supplied to customers throughout China and in Europe. It has a robust 
market position which Mr. Xiang claims is due to his willingness to introduce 
Western technology and his loyalty to the Party. 
 
Agreements to trade are supported by written contracts, and regular 
inspections of Mr. Xiang’s premises. But he says that since many of his 
customers are old friends, mutual trust, cooperation and flexibility play a 
major role in the success of the firm. 
 
Mr. Xiang clearly builds on his long-established connections with the State 
and within state-owned enterprises to maintain the valuable customer and 
supplier base he inherited and has since expanded. He is a member of the 
Committee for Power Line Materials of the Ministry of Power, and has been 
appointed the sole manufacturer of power armour clamps for the Ministry. Mr. 
Xiang says he drew on personal connections in order to secure the private 
water and power supplies which are vital to his rurally-located operation. 
Good relations with the village authorities recently enabled him to build a road 
connecting to the main highway. Mr. Xiang observes that human resources 
are most important to the success of his business and that he has good 
relations with the Workers Union, as well as the Consumers Association and 
his Trade Association. Political influence at the local level is also important to 
Mr Xiang’s enterprise; he is a loyal Party member and proud of the large 
pictures of Marx, Lenin, Engels, and Mao displayed in his office. 
 
Case study 4: Mr. Zhu. 
 
 Mr. Zhu is 36. He began his career in the private sector 15 years’ ago when 
he set up a boiler repair shop with 7 employees. He says that old-style boilers 
were noisy and his innovation was to make them work quietly. Mr. Zhu says 
he has never turned to the bank for loans but uses the cash paid in deposits 
on boilers as capital for expansion. He states that his firm is immune from 
political events “because I have influence” and that his dominant position in 
the market is protected because “I am too big”.  Mr. Zhu describes himself as 
“the Boiler King”. He portrays his expansion to an enterprise with nine 
branches in different provinces, 1672 employees, and a turnover of RMB300 
million, as seamless. In fact, Mr.Zhu had forgotten that he had been 
interviewed by one of the authors two years’ previously, shortly after he had 
been declared bankrupt following entry into the supermarket sector and 
investment in a shopping mall. This event was widely known since it was 
reported in the press. Senior Party cadres had introduced us to Mr. Zhu as a 
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“model entrepreneur”. Mr. Zhu and the Party cadres only reluctantly confirmed 
this earlier business failure, pointing both to its insignificance and to “the 
difficult trading conditions” prevailing at the time. Soon after this admission, 
the authors politely brought the interview to an end. Responses to questions 
were becoming incoherent, perhaps due to the quantity of alcohol being 
imbibed by Mr. Zhu and the Party cadres. Drinking was accompanied by 
toasts to the Party, and to China as represented by the boiler industry. The 
authors concluded that the relationship between Mr. Zhu and the Party has 
been of major significance in Mr. Zhu’s economic activities, although the 
precise nature of the relationship remains unclear. 
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